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Autoconhecimento e virtudes epistêmicas: entre o 
confiabilismo e o responsabilismo
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Abstract: This paper is about the role of self-knowledge in the cognitive 
life of a virtuous knower. The main idea is that it is hard to know 
ourselves because introspection is an unreliable epistemic source, 
and reason can be a source of insidious forms of self-deception. 
Nevertheless, our epistemic situation is such that an epistemically 
responsible agent must be constantly looking for a better understanding 
of her own character traits and beliefs, under the risk of jeopardizing 
her own status as a knower, ruining her own intellectual life.
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cognitiva de um sujeito que mereça ser considerado possuidor de 
conhecimento. A ideia central é que é difícil alcançar o conhecimento de 
si, pois a introspecção é uma fonte de crenças pouco confiável, e a razão 
pode ser a fonte de formas extremas de autoengano. Apesar disso, a 
nossa situação é tal que um agente epistêmico responsável deve buscar 
constantemente uma melhor compreensão dos seus próprios traços de 
caráter e crenças, sob o risco de pôr em perigo o seu status de sujeito 
possuidor de conhecimento.
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Introduction
In this paper, I use virtue epistemology for the inquiry of self-knowledge1. I will argue that self-knowledge never can be fully obtained, but must 
be always looked for, because an epistemic agent has to try hardly to 
know herself, since that’s the price of intellectual virtue. I will proceed 
as follows. First, I will present the basics of virtue epistemology, and the 
main theories of self-knowledge. Then I will use virtue epistemology for 
the analysis of self-knowledge.
1 Virtue Epistemology
Virtue epistemology is an approach to traditional epistemological 
problems proposed by Ernest Sosa in his seminal paper “The Raft and 
the Pyramid”2. The idea was inspired by the Aristotelian approach to 
ethics on the rise since the 1950s3. In virtue ethics, a laudable action is 
an action produced through a process properly related to a moral virtue. 
By analogy, in epistemology, a praiseworthy belief is a belief produced 
by a process involving an intellectual virtue.
Having in mind specifically Sosa’s seminal paper, and the philosophical 
debates of its time, virtue epistemology was presented, some twenty-five 
years ago, as an alternative both to epistemological foundationalism and 
epistemological coherentism. Sosa describes the main dilemma of the 
epistemologists of these days as the choice “between the solid security 
of the ancient foundationalist pyramid and the risky adventure of the new 
coherentist raft”4. As a way out, Sosa proposes that:
1 Traditionally, the question of self-knowledge is reduced to the question of the knowledge of 
one’s own occurrent mental states. Examples of traditional questions about self-knowledge 
are ‘How do I know that I am in pain?,’ and ‘How do I know that I’m thinking that p?’. More 
consequential and interesting examples would be, for instance, ‘Am I a good teacher?,’ 
or ‘Am I a racist?’; see CASSAM, Quassim, Self-Knowledge for Humans, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. As I see it, responsibilism can be used to explain traditional cases of 
self-knowledge and to explore the more interesting cases of self-knowledge.
2 See SOSA, Ernest, The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory 
of Knowledge, in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5 (1980), p. 3-25.
3 See KVANVIG, Jonathan L., Virtue Epistemology, in: BERNECKER, Sven and PRITCHARD, 
Duncan (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2011, p. 199-207.
4 See SOSA, Ernest, The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of 
Knowledge, op. cit., p. 3. The idea behind Sosa’s metaphors is that, on the one hand, while 
foundationalism is the search for foundational beliefs, promising solid grounds (but opening 
the possibility of infinite regress), virtue epistemology proposes foundational personal virtues 
(the character traits shaping the practices of the agent), instead of beliefs, as the ground 
for knowledge. On the other hand, while coherentism is blind or at least short-sighted for 
the relation between truth and belief, a virtue epistemologist sees as virtuous the personal 
skills or character traits conducive to truth. So, virtue epistemology is a hope in the search 
for solution of old difficulties in the field of epistemology.
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[…] primary justification would apply to intellectual virtues, to stable 
dispositions for belief acquisition, through their greater contribution 
toward getting us to the truth. Secondary justification would then attach 
to particular beliefs in virtue of their source in intellectual virtues or other 
such justified dispositions5.
So, key to Sosa’s proposal is to describe the epistemological concept 
of justification as a concept that applies, first of all, to some personal 
capacities or dispositions of believers (or knowers). Sosa dubs these 
capacities as intellectual virtues. The main demand of the original 
proposal, still present in contemporary virtue theories of knowledge, is 
to apply the concept of justification primarily to the cognitive faculties 
or character traits of believers, secondarily to their beliefs6. ‘Justified’ 
is, primarily, the process of belief production, secondarily, the output or 
product of the process, which is the belief. This shift in the focus of the 
concept of justification, from beliefs to believers, is very important for 
the works of all virtue epistemologists, including the early reception of 
Sosa’s work by Lorraine Code (1984)7. But, as we will see, while Sosa’s 
proposal involves reliable dispositions8, central to Code’s proposal is the 
concept of epistemic responsibility, since virtue epistemology comes in 
two versions, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism9.
2 Two Kinds of Virtue Epistemology
As we saw, virtue epistemology is proposed as an analog, in the field 
of epistemology, for virtue ethics in the field of practical philosophy. But 
how are we supposed to understand the analogy? In the field of moral 
philosophy, a virtue ethicist says that a virtuous or excellent action is 
the output of a practical process conduced by a generous, courageous, 
honest, temperate (and so on) character. In the appropriations of the 
epistemologists, the analogy has two readings:
5 See SOSA, Ernest, The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory 
of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 23, author’s italics.
6 Goldman identifies “the concept of justified belief with the concept of belief obtained through 
the exercise of intellectual virtues (excellences)”; see GOLDMAN, Alvin, Epistemic Folkways 
and Scientific Epistemology, in: Philosophical Issues, 3 (1993), p. 274 (271-285).
7 See CODE, Lorraine, Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology, in: Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 45:1 (1984), p. 29-50.
8 See SOSA, Ernest, The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory 
of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 23.
9 See BAEHR, Jason, Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology, op. cit., p. 193: “Standard 
characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism 
and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive 
faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual 
character traits.”
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(a) Reliabilism: a virtuous (or excellent) belief is the product of 
an epistemic process that reliably conduces to truth, such as 
perception, memory, inference and introspection. (I will speak more 
about the reliability of introspection below.) The most prominent 
virtue reliabilists are Ernest Sosa (1980)10, Alvin Goldman (1993)11 
and John Greco (2010)12.
(b) Responsibilism: a virtuous (or excellent) belief is the product of 
an epistemic process conduced by a fair-minded, open-minded, 
intellectually careful, intellectually courageous (and so on) agent. 
The most prominent virtue responsibilists are Lorraine Code (1984)13, 
James Montmarquet (1993)14 and Linda Zagzebski (1996, 2000)15.
In summary, on the one hand, virtue reliabilists assess as virtuous (or 
excellent) the subpersonal cognitive skills (or faculties) of the agent. On 
the other hand, virtue responsibilists assess as epistemically virtuous 
personal-level character traits such as intellectual responsibility, fair-
mindedness, open-mindedness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual 
courage, intellectual humility, intelligence, empathy, integrity, 
perseverance, faith in reason, and so on16.
2.1  Reliabilism
Sosa’s approach to virtue epistemology is reliabilist. Roughly, 
reliabilism in epistemology is the view that knowledge is true belief 
“obtained by a reliable process”17. Since the 1970s, many reliabilist 
10 See SOSA, Ernest, The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory 
of Knowledge, op. cit.,  p. 3-25.
11 GOLDMAN, Alvin, Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology, op. cit., 1993.
12 See GRECO, John, Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic 
Normativity, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Sometimes, to classify virtue 
epistemologists is not so easy. On the list of virtues, GOLDMAN, Alvin, Epistemic Folkways 
and Scientific Epistemology, op. cit., p. 275, says that “the virtues include belief formation 
based on sight, hearing, memory, reasoning in certain ‘approved’ ways, and so forth.” As 
I see it, that’s a mixed list, reliabilist and responsibilist, since perception and memory are 
subpersonal faculties, but reasoning in ‘approved’ ways is a personal-level output.
13 See CODE, Lorraine, Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology, op. cit., p. 29-50.
14 See MONTMARQUET, James, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1993.
15 See ZAGZEBSKI, Linda, Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1996; EADEM, From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology, in: AXTELL, Guy (ed.), Knowledge, 
Belief and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.
16 See CODE, Lorraine, Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology, op. cit., p. 29-50; AXTELL, Guy, 
Introduction, in: AXTELL, Guy (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue 
Epistemology, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000; BAEHR, Jason, Character, Reliability 
and Virtue Epistemology, op. cit., p. 193.
17 See RAMSEY, Frank, Knowledge, in: RAMSEY, Frank, The Foundations of Mathematics and 
Other Logical Essays, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931, p. 110, apud COMESAÑA, 
Juan, Reliabilism, in: BERNECKER, Sven and PRITCHARD, Duncan (eds.), The Routledge 
Companion to Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2011, p. 176.
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theories were developed to solve Gettier (1963)18 puzzles about the 
analysis of knowledge as justified true belief19. The usual reliabilist 
strategy is to explain the concept of justification a la Ramsey: a true 
belief is justified when it’s the output of a reliable process20. Bringing 
the two ends (intellectual virtues and reliabilism) together, Sosa’s theory 
of knowledge says that knowledge is the output of a process that is 
justified because it involves intellectual virtues, and intellectual virtues 
are reliable. So, generalizing Sosa’s view, a virtue reliabilist says that 
knowledge is achievement from intellectual virtues, or excellences21.
2.2  Responsibilism as a Criticism of Reliabilism
I will first present a simpler form of responsibilism. Below I will fill 
some blanks. For a responsibilist, “intellectual virtues are personality 
traits that a person who desires the truth would want to have”22. It 
means that an intellectual virtue is a personal-level disposition that is 
truth-conducive.
Lorraine Code is one of the main epistemologists in the responsibilist 
side. Code’s project is to implement Sosa’s view, making explicit the 
importance of the knower in the “account of the nature and conditions 
of knowledge”23. There is common ground between Sosa’s and Code’s 
theories, since in both theories the goal is to apply the concept of 
justification primarily to believers (or knowers), secondarily to beliefs 
(or knowledge). But their paths come apart on the issue of the proper 
characterization of an intellectual virtue. Code argues that since reliability 
without responsibility is not enough to generate a virtuous epistemic 
relation to the world24, the intellectual virtues have to be located at the 
personal level:
18 See GETTIER, Edmund, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, in: Analysis, 23 (1963), 
p. 121-123.
19 See COMESAÑA, Juan, Reliabilism, in: BERNECKER, Sven and PRITCHARD, Duncan (eds.), 
op. cit., p. 176.
20 Id. ibid., p. 177.
21 See GRECO, John, Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, 
2010.
22 See GRECO, John and TURRI, John, Virtue Epistemology, in: ZALTA, Edward N. (ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), URL = <http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/win2013/entries/epistemology-virtue/>, accessed Nov. 14, 2014.
23 See CODE, Lorraine, Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology, op. cit., p. 30.
24 More recently, PRITCHARD, Duncan and TURRI, John, The Value of Knowledge, in: ZALTA, 
Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-value/>, accessed Nov. 11, 
2014, objected to virtue reliabilism that sometimes reliability is not enough to knowledge, 
sometimes it’s not necessary. I cannot deal with this question in this paper. See KELP, 
Christoph, In Defense of Virtue Epistemology, in: Synthese, 179 (2011), p. 409-433.
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To be intellectually virtuous is not just to have a good score in terms 
of cognitive endeavours that come out right. It is much more a matter 
of orientation toward the world, and toward one’s knowledge-seeking 
self, and other such selves as part of the world. Virtues, both moral 
and intellectual, have much more to do with the manner of relation to 
the world than with the ‘content’ of particular actions or knowledge 
claims25.
Code’s critique is devastating for any reliabilist project in virtue 
epistemology that eschews the concept of responsibility. Reliable is the 
process which output has a high truth-ratio26. But, Code says, “a good 
score” is not enough for intellectual virtue. That’s a reductio of virtue 
reliabilism without epistemic responsibility. Parsing the argument:
(1) If virtue reliabilism is right, then production of a high ratio of true 
beliefs is enough to intellectual virtue.
(2) But production of a high ratio of true beliefs without epistemic 
responsibility is not enough to intellectual virtue.
(3) Therefore, virtue reliabilism is not right.
Since Code’s fundamental intellectual virtue is epistemic 
responsibility27, what is lacking in virtue reliabilism is the responsibility 
of the agent. When the agent is epistemically responsible, she is 
intellectually virtuous. Thus, Code’s formula for virtue epistemology is:
S knows that p iff the true belief that p is actively obtained by an 
epistemically responsible (intellectually virtuous) process.
In sum, according to Code’s proposal, an intellectual virtue is a full-
blood character trait (instead of a merely subpersonal cognitive faculty) 
that contributes for the justification or warrant of a belief28. Code’s theory 
amounts to attribute justification to epistemic processes conduced with 
epistemic responsibility. Having in mind two things, first, that according 
to virtue epistemology an agent S achieves knowledge when her true 
belief is the product of an excellent (or virtuous) cognitive process, 
second, that epistemic responsibility is the fundamental intellectual 
virtue, S knows when her true belief is the output of her epistemic 
responsibility29.
25 See CODE, Lorraine, Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology, op. cit., p. 41.
26 See COMESAÑA, Juan, Reliabilism, in: BERNECKER, Sven and PRITCHARD, Duncan (eds.), 
op. cit., p. 182.
27 See CODE, Lorraine, Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology, op. cit., p. 42.
28 See BAEHR, Jason, Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology, op. cit., p. 194.
29 This point is related to the question of the value of knowledge, but I will not discuss the issue 
here. See GRECO, John, The Value Problem, in: BERNECKER, Sven and PRITCHARD, Duncan 
(eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2011, p. 219-231.
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2.3  Responsibilism as a Kind of Reliabilism
Code’s criticism of reliabilism presupposes the incompatibility 
between reliability and responsibility. I guess that her motivation is the 
view of reliability as a too mechanicistic concept: “We would speak of a 
“reliable” computer, but not of a “responsible” one”30. Linda Zagzebski31, 
by her turn, depicts responsibility as a kind of reliability. Zagzebski’s 
view can be parsed like that:
(1) S is motivated to get to the truth.
(2) S acts in reliable ways because of that motive.
(3) S is successful because of the motive and the reliable processes 
occasioned by the motivation.
(4) Then S’s epistemic state worth more than true belief – it’s 
knowledge.
I think that Zagzebski’s view is correct. As a matter of fact, we usually 
classify responsible people as reliable people. Computers can be just 
reliable, but people can be reliable and have to be responsible. Moreover, 
Code’s criticism of virtue reliabilism is that reliability is no condition for 
knowledge – it’s not necessary, and it’s not sufficient. But how could the 
moral concept of responsibility generate epistemic outputs by itself? It 
can’t. Responsible cognitive agents produce knowledge because they 
are reliable.
In summary, a virtue epistemologist says that a belief is justified 
if it is the output of a reliable process. A reliable process involves an 
intellectual virtue as a stable mean for the production of true beliefs. 
Some virtue epistemologists, the virtue reliabilists, say that cognitive 
faculties such as perception, memory, reasoning and introspection 
are intellectual virtues. Some other virtue epistemologists, the virtue 
responsibilists, disagree. They say that the real intellectual virtues are 
the character traits conducive to truth, such as impartiality, awareness 
of one’s own fallibility, perseverance in the investigation of unpopular 
ideas, and so on. Nevertheless, the two varieties of virtue epistemology 
are not incompatible. It’s possible to put the two together in a single 
theory, and it’s good to do that, because the resulting theory is stronger. 
In this resulting mixed theory, justified is, primarily, any truth-conducive 
cognitive faculty or character trait. If they are truth-conducive, then they 
are reliable. I will use this mixed theory for the analysis of self-knowledge.
So much for tool-sharpening.
30 See CODE, Lorraine, Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology, op. cit., p. 40.
31 See ZAGZEBSKI, Linda, From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology, in: AXTELL, Guy (ed.), op. 
cit., 2000.
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3 Self-Knowledge
There are two main groups of accounts for the knowledge of one’s own 
mental states, namely empiricism and rationalism32. The main empiricist 
theory is Armstrong’s inner sense theory33. The main rationalist theory 
is Moran’s transparency theory34.
3.1  Introspection
Introspection or inner sense is the ability to quasi-perceptually access 
one’s own mental states35, which means that introspection is the internal 
analog for perceptual knowledge36. We perceive our own mental states by 
the inner sense, just as we perceive the external world by the traditional 
five senses.
The faculty of introspection figures in virtue reliabilists lists of 
intellectual virtues, which implies that introspection is seen as a reliable 
source of true beliefs. Nevertheless, as we will see, the question of the 
reliability of the ‘inner sense’ is at least polemical, if not plainly hopeless.
In inner sense theory, the analogy with the external senses explains why 
introspection is reliable, but not infallible37. Under some circumstances, 
inner sense can give false beliefs about our own mental states in the same 
way that vision can give false beliefs about distant round (or square) 
 
32 See GERTLER, Brie, Self-knowledge, London: Routledge, 2011.
33 See ARMSTRONG, D. M., Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?, in: The philosophical 
Review, 72:4 (1963), p. 417-432.
34 See MORAN, Richard, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001.
35 Sometimes, ‘introspection’ is viewed as a synonym for ‘self-knowledge.’ But this kind of view 
just begs the question. A fuller exposition of problems related to the notion of introspection 
would require the proper distinction between at least three different varieties of phenomena: 
introspection as one single thought event, introspection as meta-cognition and introspection 
as narrative about oneself. Unfortunately, this kind of investigation is beyond the limits of 
this paper.
36 An empiricist such as ARMSTRONG, D. M., Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?, op. cit., 
(1963), p. 417-432, defends that knowledge of our own mental states is similar to knowledge 
of the external world, since all kinds of knowledge are achieved by the senses: mental states 
by inner sense, external world by external senses (see GERTLER, Brie, Self-knowledge, 
2011). Inner sense theory has its own epistemological problems. E.g., our external senses are 
enabled by external sensory organs. By analogy, do we have (at least) one internal sensory 
organ in our brains? I will not address this question in this paper.
37 That’s the difference between Armstrong’s theory of introspection and the theory of 
acquaintance of RUSSELL, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1912, p. 76. Introspection is fallible, Russell’s acquaintance is infallible. As a subtopic 
(a new layer of confusion) related to the word ‘acquaintance,’ but unrelated to infallibility, 
DRETSKE, Fred, Skeptical Doubts About Self-Knowledge, in: BERNECKER, Sven and 
PRITCHARD, Duncan (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, London: Routledge, 
2011, p. 425-432, dubs as ‘acquaintance’ the usual (and fallible) familiarity that an agent has 
with her own mental states.
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towers38. But inner sense also can be truth-conducive in the same way 
that vision can be truth-conducive39. The problem is that, empirically, 
the truth-ratio for beliefs generated by inner sense is really bad, which 
means that introspection is not reliable. So, it’s not an intellectual virtue. 
Having that information in mind, can introspection be the source of self-
knowledge? As a matter of a priori metaphysical possibility, yes it can. 
But, as a matter of historical (biological, developmental) contingency, we 
have lots of reasons to say that no, it can’t. The problem is that the nice 
and reliable introspection of the philosophers can’t be found by empirical 
research. The following a priori conditions are not empirically satisfied 
by some introspective faculty of real people.
Introspective beliefs are epistemically justified only if they are both 
safe and virtuous: safe in that the belief would then be held only if true; 
virtuous in that it derives from the exercise of an intellectual virtue, an 
internal condition, as explained, that enables the subject to attain certain 
desirable intellectual ends, pre-eminently that of truth40.
Epistemic safety is not my concern in this paper, since my focus is 
only on epistemic virtue. According to Sosa, an introspective belief is a 
belief which content is generated by the faculty of introspection. This 
belief is virtuous if the faculty of introspection enables the agent to attain 
an epistemic goal such as truth or understanding.
Is it metaphysically possible that an agent (extraterrestrial, perhaps) 
obtain a true belief about her own mental states through the virtuous 
faculty of introspection? Yes, it is, since there is no contradiction involved 
in the proposal. But is it empirically probable that a human agent obtain 
this kind of knowledge by this kind of source? Hardly. Rarely.
The empirical findings of Nisbett and Wilson41 about the unreliability 
of the faculty of introspection are bad news for Armstrong and Sosa. There 
 
38 In contemporary theory, in the most usual construction, inner sense is the faculty that 
generates second-order beliefs about first-order mental states. That’s Higher-Order Theory 
(HOT). Some other philosophers construct inner sense as Higher-Order Perception (HOP). 
And there are still other philosophers that construct inner sense as Self-Representational 
(SR) belief or perception (see KIDD, Chad, The Idols of Inner-Sense, in: Philosophical Studies 
(online), October 28, 2014. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-014-0389-6). In the history of philosophy, 
Descartes saw inner sense as a first-order perception of ‘internal’ states of the body, such 
as hunger and thirst (see BAKER, Gordon and MORRIS, Katherine J., Descartes’ Dualism, 
London: Routledge, 1996), which means that Descartes was an empiricist about inner sense.
39 The theory is naturalistic, since it says that a subpersonal cognitive faculty explains first-
person authority. Psychologists and neuroscientists do research it empirically.
40 See SOSA, Ernest, Consciousness and Self-Knowledge, in: GERTLER, Brie (ed.), Privileged 
Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Farnham: Ashgate, p. 261.
41 See NISBETT, Richard E. and WILSON, Timothy DeCamp, Telling More Than We Can Know: 
Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, in: Psychological Review, 84:3 (1977), p. 231-259.
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is empirical evidence that we have little or no access to a higher order 
cognitive process such as introspection42. When people are prompted 
to report their own states of mind, “their reports are based on a priori, 
implicit causal theories, or judgements about the extent to which a 
particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response”43. So we 
don’t introspect ourselves. Instead, we create theories for the contents 
of our own minds that are plausible because they cohere with our 
behavior and the contextually observed situation of the external world. 
As a matter of fact, these ex post facto theories are reliable44. But they 
are not introspected45.
Let’s take stoke. As a matter of contingent fact about the human 
condition, we can’t know ourselves by introspection. Thus, for we human 
beings, introspection isn’t a reliable ground for belief. Introspection, for 
we human beings, isn’t an intellectual virtue. So we have to be skeptical 
about the possibility of human self-knowledge grounded on the outputs 
of introspection.
3.2  Rationalism
We can’t know ourselves by self-observation. Can we know ourselves 
by the sheer endorsement of our own reasons? Let’s see Moran’s theory 
about the normal mode of belief-formation46. It’s based on a famous 
passage from the work of Gareth Evans:
[I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, 
or occasionally literally, directed outward – upon the world. If 
someone asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world 
war?,’ I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same 
outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the 
question ‘Will there be a third world war?’47.
Transparency is the feature of the first-person perspective that 
explains why, when S self-ascribes a belief, S looks towards the external 
42 Id. ibid., p. 231. A cognitive process is a process “mediating the effects of a stimulus on a 
response”.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Example: It’s Saturday morning, and eight years old Sam just want to watch cartoons on TV. 
But there is no cartoons because every TV channel is broadcasting the funeral of a princess. 
Sam is mad and upset. Her mother asks why she is so upset (‘Oh darling, it’s because your 
beloved princess died?’), Sam answers that’s because there is no cartoons to watch. Her 
answer is a plausible and reliable ex post facto theory.
46 Moran’s theory of self-knowledge involves an argument against the self-observational model. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, I will skip it, since we already have sufficient grounds 
for the rejection of inner sense theory.
47 See EVANS, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 225.
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world, not inwards herself48. According to Moran’s model, one knows 
one’s own attitudes by knowing one’s own reasons, with no need of 
self-observation49. Since one’s own propositional attitudes have to be 
tied to one’s own reasons, S can know S’s own mind just assessing S’s 
own reasons50. If asked about the weather, S should ground her answer 
in (something like) S’s visual experience of rain outdoors, and report 
it’s raining. This report would have two epistemic roles. First, it would 
report what S knows about the weather. Second, it would report what 
S knows about S’s own mind: that S believes it’s raining. S doesn’t 
need to introspect to know it about herself, because the consideration 
of S’s own reasons is enough, and argument is required to collapse a 
reasoning process into an introspective process. So, according to Moran’s 
theory, self-knowledge is special for a normative reason: the rights and 
responsibilities of a rational agent are enough for the agent’s knowledge 
of her own mental states. This model is different from the observational 
model, in which self-knowledge is special by the way of knowledge 
involved: self-observation. The transparency method is intrinsically first-
personal, since it works just for S’s knowledge of S’s own propositional 
attitudes, not working, for instance, for my knowledge of your mental 
states or your knowledge of my own mental states.
In sum, Moran says that S’s endorsing of p (the action of the 
endorsement) is enough for S’s knowledge of S’s own belief that p. So, 
in Moran’s theory, transparency is a method for the achievement of self-
knowledge. The problem is that belief and endorsement are very different 
phenomena51. Imagine a case involving Müller-Lyer illusion. Moved by 
reasons, S could wholly endorse the proposition that the two lines have 
 
48 In Moran’s theory, the transparency method is required for self-knowledge because it’s 
constitutive of the concept of a person to see herself as a center of causality moved by 
reasons (see SCHMID, Ulla, Where Individuals Meet Society: The Collective Dimensions of 
Self-Evaluation and Self-Knowledge, in: ZIV, Anita K.; LEHRER, Keith; SCHMID, Hans B. (eds.), 
Self-Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality, Dordrecht: Springer, 2011, p. 
266). Something capable of detecting a flow of mental states about the world without taking 
a stance would not be an agent.
49 GERTLER, Brie, op. cit., 2011, objects that the transparency theory explains the formation of 
new intentional attitudes, saying nothing about the attitudes the subject already endorses. 
But this objection begs the question, since it put apart from the realm of knowledge the 
attitudes achieved by transparency (see SCHMID, Ulla, Where Individuals Meet Society: 
The Collective Dimensions of Self-Evaluation and Self-Knowledge, in: ZIV, Anita K.; LEHRER, 
Keith; SCHMID, Hans B. (eds.), op. cit., p. 263).
50 See SILVA FILHO, Waldomiro and DAZZANI, Maria Virginia, Self, Sign, Belief, and Agency, 
in: Interacções, 24 (2013), p. 84: “(Condition of Transparency:) The question of the first person 
present tense about his/her own belief (“Do I believe that p?”) is answered in relation to the 
same reasons that justify an answer to the corresponding question about the world (about 
the truth of p).”
51 See MCGEER, Victoria, The Moral Development of First-Person Authority, in: European Journal 
of Philosophy, 16:1 (2007), p. 81-108.
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the same length, without fully believing it. Belief is much more complex 
than endorsement.
3.3  Partial Conclusion About Empiricism and Rationalism 
  Concerning Self-Knowledge
Empirical research on introspection show it as an utterly unreliable 
faculty. There is no minimal guarantee that an agent S relying on 
introspection would obtain genuine knowledge, because we human beings 
are prone to call ‘introspection’ our own ex post facto rationalizations. 
Introspection is no intellectual virtue.
Moran transparency theory is restricted only to beliefs. It gives no 
account for other propositional attitudes as desire or fear. It can’t explain 
the knowledge of one’s own feelings and emotions. Moran’s account 
of belief doesn’t work properly because belief is unduly reduced to 
endorsement.
4 Back to Responsibilism
Introspection can’t be an epistemic ground for self-knowledge because 
it’s not an intellectual virtue, and Moran’s rationalism failed for its own 
problems52. The solution can be away, at the core of virtue responsibilism. 
Crucial to virtue epistemology is to ground justification primarily on the 
believer (or knower). But, in the case of self-knowledge, we can’t ground 
it on introspection or other intellectual virtues of virtue reliabilism. Can 
we ground it on the intellectual virtues of virtue responsibilism?
Code’s central intellectual virtue is epistemic responsibility. S knows 
that p iff the true belief that p is actively obtained by an epistemically 
responsible process. The knower has to choose, “and is accountable 
for these choices”53. Being epistemically responsible, S substantiates 
her beliefs “with intellectual honesty and due care”, “knowing what 
cognitive ends are worth pursuing”54. Intelligence also is an intellectual 
virtue. Being intelligent, S “attempts to look at the situations clearly, 
carefully, so as not to be unduly swayed by affectivity”55. Prudence is 
a third intellectual (and moral) virtue. Being prudent, S has “a sense of 
one’s limitations”56.
52 Perhaps reason can do the work in some kind of inferentialism about self-knowledge (see 
CASSAM, Quassim, Self-Knowledge for Humans, 2014), but that is not the subject of this 
paper.
53 See See CODE, Lorraine, Toward a ‘Responsibilist’ Epistemology, op. cit., p. 40.
54 Id. ibid., p. 41.
55 Ibid., p. 42; author’s italics.
56 Ibid., p. 43.
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In summary, an intellectually virtuous believer (or knower) actively 
looks for meaningful grounds for her beliefs, being honest and careful. 
She is aware of the perils of bias caused by emotional attachments, but 
she also stays alert for the vice of lack of proper empathy for the others. 
Lastly, she knows that she can’t know everything, and for this reason 
she puts her intellectual energy in questions of collective importance 
and projects that can we finished or at least carried out with her own 
intellectual forces. This portrait of an intellectually virtuous agent is the 
portrait of a virtuous seeker of knowledge and self-knowledge:
Intellectual virtue is a matter, too, of orientation toward one’s knowledge-
seeking self. What I mean by this is that, for the intellectually virtuous, 
self-knowledge is as important as, and indeed complementary to, 
knowledge of the world. […] I think it is just because self tends to obtrude 
so insistently in all human activity, all attempts to be ‘objective,’ that 
self-knowledge is essential. It is important to know […] oneself if one is to 
achieve a just estimation of the degree to which one does know, believe 
justifiably, deceive oneself, of fail in epistemic responsibility. […] Here 
[…] because of the impossibility of separating knower and known, the 
difficulties of assessment are great. Nonetheless, despite the apparent 
circularity in such undertaking, one must strive to know oneself if one 
is responsibly to assess the degree of one’s own responsibility, both 
epistemic and moral. One cannot improve upon it if one does not know 
it. Reflexivity is both a fact of human capacity and (potentially, at least) 
a value57.
In Code’s view, to know the world the agent has to be intellectually 
virtuous. But, to be intellectually virtuous, the agent must at least try 
hardly to know herself. Self-knowledge is not a special kind of knowledge, 
it is one of the epistemic goals for any knower, because to neglect self-
knowledge is to lack intellectual virtue.
So responsibilism holds a place for self-knowledge. One must try to 
know one’s own beliefs and character traits to become more intellectually 
virtuous. In a Socratic note, we could say that striving is enough, 
achieving is not required. Self-knowledge is a task to be performed, not 
a fact to be explained. Self-knowledge is a practical possibility to be 
sought by the virtuous58.
57 Ibid.
58 I would like to thank to the audiences of 1º Colóquio Internacional de Epistemologia Analítica 
(September 2-5, 2014, Santa Maria, RS, Brazil), IV International Meeting on Skepticism: The 
Value of Understanding (November 17-19, 2014, Salvador, BA, Brazil), V Jornada Nacional de 
Pesquisa na Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da UFSM (November 26-28, 2014, Santa Maria, RS, 
Brazil). Special thanks to Hilan Bensusan, Eros M. de Carvalho, Juan Comesaña, Rogerio S. 
Correa, Paulo Faria, Marcelo Fischborn, Chris Kelp, Carlos Sartori, Waldomiro J. Silva Filho, 
Luca Tateo and Flavio Williges.
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